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Enhancing the robustness of scale-free networks
1. Introduction 
We live in a world of complex networks, e.g. the Internet, WWW, power grids, social 
networks and etc. Through probing, collecting and analyzing the topology data of complex 
networks, people found that the traditional ER (Erdos-Renyi) model [1] cannot well simulate 
some practical networks such as Internet and WWW. For WWW, Barabάsi and Albert found 
that the degree distribution follows the power-law form p(k)= k
-r 
with r > 2. This feature also 
appears to exist in many other complex networks and such networks are called scale-free 
networks. It is interesting but somewhat amazing that Barabάsi and Albert proposed a simple 
mechanism, called BA model [2], to explain the generation of scale-free networks. Since then, 
the study of scale-free networks has attracted wide attention from many different research 
fields. Our group developed Dolphin System [3, 4] to probe the IPv6 Internet and found that 
the IPv6 AS (Autonomous System) backbone network was also scale-free with r < 2 [5]. The 
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [6] also developed their own 
IPv6 probing tool called Scamper [7]. 
An important characteristic of scale-free networks is the heterogeneity of the degree 
distribution, which makes the scale-free network tolerant to random failures but extremely 
vulnerable to malicious attacks. Error tolerance and attack vulnerability are two common and 
important properties of complex networks [8]. The relative size of the largest cluster S [8, 9] 
and the average inversed geodesic L
-1 
[9] are used to characterize the behavior of the network 
during attacks. We can also introduce the average network efficiency [10] 
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Abstract 
Error tolerance and attack vulnerability are two common and important properties of 
complex networks, which are usually used to evaluate the robustness of a network. 
Recently, much work has been devoted to determining the network design with 
optimal robustness. However, little attention has been paid to the problem of how to 
improve the robustness of existing networks. In this paper, we present a new 
parameter α, called enforcing parameter, to guide the process of enhancing the 
robustness of scale-free networks by gradually adding new links. Intuitively, α < 0 
means the nodes with lower degrees are selected preferentially while the nodes with 
higher degrees will be more probably selected when α > 0. It is shown both 
theoretically and experimentally that when α < 0 the attack survivability of the 
network can be enforced apparently. Then we propose new strategies to enhance the 
network robustness. Through extensive experiments and comparisons, we conclude 
that establishing new links between nodes with low degrees can drastically enforce the 
attack survivability of scale-free networks while having little impact on the error 
tolerance. 
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.20.Hh, 89.75.-k, 89.75.Hc 
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where N is the size of the network and dij is the length of the shortest path between i and j. 
The error tolerance of the network can be measured by the entropy, which is computed based 
on the degree distribution of the network [11, 12]. During the malicious attacks or random 
failures, fc is always used to characterize the critical fraction of the least nodes that need to be 
removed until the network is collapsed [13, 14].  fc
rand
 and fc
targ
 were used as responses to 
random failures and malicious attacks respectively in [13]. In particular, fc
rand
 can be easily 
computed by the following formula [15] 
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where <k> is the first moment (mean value) of the degree and <k
2
> is the second moment of 
the degree. But for fc
targ
, we need to solve a few difficult functions depending on the degree 
distribution [13, 16, 17]. Some optimal models were presented to generate robust networks 
against random failures and attacks [13, 14]. And it was also proved that there were no more 
than three node connectivities in optimal networks [18]. 
In fact, it is impractical to keep <k> a constant and rewire the links [13] for real networks. 
For example, either the Internet or the power grids have been formed so long and thus it is 
almost impossible to re-establish them to enhance the network robustness. However, one 
thing we could do is to add a smaller number of links to the network to achieve higher 
robustness. 
In this paper, we study the problem of how to improve the robustness of existing 
networks and find that the attack survivability of scale-free networks can be enforced greatly 
by gradually adding new links between the nodes with low degrees, while having little impact 
on the error tolerance. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, malicious 
attacks based on degree are performed and the robustness of scale-free networks is analyzed. 
In section 3, we mainly discuss how to enforce the network robustness based on extensive 
Figure 1. The numerical experiment is implemented on the topology data from Dolphin and CAIDA 
Scamper. Both (a) and (b) are linear-log plots, the horizontal axis is defined as the fraction of 
removed nodes, which is Nr/N. We use E, the average network efficiency in (a) and S, the relative 
size of the largest cluster in (b) to characterize the behavior during the attack. And the attack is based 
on the degree of the node. The results show that ft
Dolphin ≈0.14，ftScamper ≈0.12. 
(b) (a) 
numerical experiments. Theoretical analysis is given in section 4. Finally, the conclusions are 
summarized in section 5. 
2. Malicious attacks based on heterogeneity 
The malicious attack towards a network is based on the heterogeneity of the degree 
distribution. To the opposite of the random failure, it removes the most important node from 
the network first. We suppose the attackers know the global topology of the network, thus 
they can locate the key node and attack it. And in fact, this might happen in real networks. We 
relate the importance of the node with its degree, and in such a case, the most import one is 
also the one with the highest degree. Then we perform experiments of malicious attacks based 
on the IPv6 AS backbone network topology.  
In this paper, we have two data sources from the Dolphin System and the Scamper 
System respectively. Both of the systems were developed to discover the global IPv6 
backbone network by traceroute. The dataset from the Dolphin System has 419 nodes and 
1820 edges, and the other from the Scamper System has 356 nodes and 1007 edges. 
In this paper, we use fr and ft to denote responses to random failures and malicious attacks 
respectively. In figure 1, IPv6 AS backbone network is vulnerable under malicious attacks 
with ft ≈0.14, but robust to random failures with fr ≈0.96. In order to extend the analysis, we 
relate the importance of the node with its betweenness [19, 20, 21], and find that the result is 
quite close to the previous result. This is mainly due to the betweenness of the node is 
strongly related with its degree in the IPv6 AS backbone network without fractal character 
[22, 23, 24]. 
In practical applications, we hope that the network can be tolerant to random 
communicating errors or failures, and also can be robust to malicious attacks, especially in the 
martial field. However, the above experiments show that the attacker just need to remove a 
very small part of the key nodes to make the whole network collapsed and malfunctioned. In 
this paper, we define the robustness as error tolerance and attack survivability. In addition, 
high robustness means both high error tolerance and attack survivability. So we hope to 
enforce the robustness of scale-free networks against attacks but still keep the error tolerance.  
3. Enhancing network robustness by adding new links 
The scale-free network can be represented as an undirected graph G (V, E), where V is the 
set of nodes and E is the set of links. Define Ψ as the set of all the possible links between the 
nodes in V. Define the set of links in the complementary graph as  
      EE  .           (3) 
Define the link degree as
 
      dse
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where ks and kd are the degrees of two nodes of the link e. We define the link degree as the 
product of the degrees of the nodes it connects mainly because the product is strongly related 
to the betweenness of the link [9], which can be used to characterize the importance of the 
link. We propose a new parameter α, called enforcing parameter, and define the probability of 
choosing a new link ei from E  as  
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The cost is a key factor that constrains the structure in establishing a network. We define the 
cost C as the ratio of the number of new links to the number of links in the initial network, 
that is 
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From (2), we can compute fr using the formula 
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But for ft, we need to check whether the condition κ < 2 is satisfied. When it is satisfied, the 
critical fraction will be ft [13]. By use of fr and ft, we can characterize the error tolerance and 
the attack survivability of the network directly and numerically. 
First, we perform numerical experiments of enhancing robustness on IPv6 AS backbone 
network topologies obtained respectively from the Dolphin System and the Scamper System. 
We perform the experiments with each pair of α and cost for 100 times and get the mean 
value as the final result. We also assume the data obeys the Gaussian distribution and then get 
Figure 2. We enforce the network robustness with the topology data from Dolphin under different α. 
The horizontal axis is defined as the cost C. In (a), α= -8,-4,-2,-1,0,1,2 from top to bottom, and it is easy 
to find that the effect of the enforcement with the decrease of α becomes more and more apparent, while 
ft keeps unchanged when α = 2. In the inner chart, it shows different ft after enforcement under different 
α with C=0.3, 0. 5, 1 from top to bottom. It can be found that the network robustness can be enforced 
more strongly when α decreases under the same cost. In (b), it shows the fluctuation of fr during the 
enforcement. It is easy to find that fr increases when α = 2 and decreases when α=0 or -8, but in a little 
range, e.g. ∆fr≈0.01105 when C=1. 
(a) 
(b) 
the two-sided confidence interval with confidence coefficient equal to 95%. For example, the 
two-sided confidence interval for ft is [0.710627, 0.727702] and finally we get ft = 0.719165 
when α = -8, C=0.5. We compare the experimental results under different values of α. In 
figure 2, we find when α < 0, the attack survivability can be greatly enforced and becomes 
even better as α decreases. When α = 0, the attack survivability is improved slowly and the 
speed becomes even slower as C increases. There is no apparent tendency of improvement 
when α > 0. In this case, the attack survivability just fluctuates a little above the initial state 
and begins to keep almost unchanged as α increases. 
In order to analyze the evolving of error tolerance when adding new links, we compute fr 
as a function of the cost C. In figure 2 (b), it can be found that fr decreases a little when α ≤ 0 
(in the range of 0.01), while increases when α > 0. We can conclude from the above 
numerical experiments that the survivability of the network can be enforced without apparent 
impact on the error tolerance when α < 0, and especially when α decreases, while the 
situation is quite different when α > 0. In fact, α = 0 means selecting two nodes randomly 
from the network which are not connected to each other and establishing a new link between 
them; α < 0 means the nodes with lower degrees are selected preferentially while the nodes 
with higher degrees will be more probably selected when α > 0. In order to find a more 
efficient way to enforce the attack survivability of the network, we let α = 0, α = -∞ and    
α = +∞ respectively, then we can get three different enforcing strategies:  
Figure 3. We enforce the network robustness with the topology data from Dolphin and BA (3, 
1000) under the strategy of ERR, ELL and EHH respectively, using ft and fr to characterize the 
fraction. (a), (c) is the results based on the data from Dolphin while (b), (d) based on the data from 
BA (3, 1000). It is shown from (a) and (b) that ELL strategy can enforce the network robustness 
drastically: Ct
Dolphin≈0.17 and Ct
BA ≈0.29 when ft ≈1. From (c) and (d), it also demonstrates that fr 
just fluctuates in a little range: ∆fr
Dolphin ≈0.004 when C=Ct
Dolphin and ∆fr
BA ≈0.003 when C = Ct
BA. 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
 ERR: Select a pair of isolated nodes randomly in the network and establish a new 
link between them. 
 ELL: Select a pair of isolated nodes with the lowest degree in the network and 
establish a new link between them. 
 EHH: Select a pair of isolated nodes with the highest degree in the network and 
establish a new link between them. 
In figure 3 (a), it is easy to find that ELL can enforce the attack survivability of the 
network with a low cost while EHH has little effect and ERR can only improve the attack 
survivability slowly and become even slower as C increases. At the same time, though the 
error tolerance of the network is weakened by ELL and ERR, but the impact is slight because 
fr is still more than 0.9. We can conclude that the attack survivability and the error tolerance 
are mutually exclusive to each other based on the above analysis of experiments. Because of 
the nature of heterogeneity, there are a lot of nodes with low degree in the network, which are 
called edge nodes, but a few nodes may have very high degrees, which are called hub nodes. 
So the network is robust to random failures and vulnerable to malicious attacks. Therefore, in 
order to enhance the network robustness, we need to make a trade-off between the attack 
survivability and the error tolerance. From the above analysis, we know that the ELL strategy 
is a good way to enhance the network robustness because it can drastically improve the attack 
survivability while keeping the high error tolerance almost unchanged as the cost C increases. 
We also perform experiments on BA model to verify the above conclusion. The BA 
model is a model of a growing network which starts from m0 nodes and adds new nodes 
preferentially connecting to the existing nodes. In this paper, we use BA(m, N) to represent the 
BA model, where N is the size of the generated network and a new node is added to the 
network with preferential links to m existing nodes. In figure 3 (b), we can find that the ELL 
strategy is still quite effective on the BA model. It means that we can extend our conclusion 
from the scale-free network with r < 2 to the ones with 2 < r ≤ 3. 
In fact, the clustering coefficient of one node in a network represents the closeness of its 
neighbors. In scale-free networks, the clustering coefficient of a hub node is low determined 
by the disassortative property. Once a hub node is attacked, its neighbors with low degrees 
would collapse for losing central transitive node. We can establish new links among the edge 
nodes which are the neighbors of the hub node to form a local loop. Because of the local loop, 
edge nodes can still connect to each other even when the hub node is attacked and collapsed. 
In the ELL strategy, the new links added to the network are mainly between the nodes with 
low degrees, so their degrees increase. However, they still occupy a large part. In contrast, the 
nodes with high degrees keep unchanged with few new links connecting to them. This can be 
found in figure 4 (a). 
4. Theoretical analysis 
To verify our conclusion above, we also provide theoretical explanation here. In order to 
simplify the analysis, we assume that the new links added to the network are assigned at first. 
We define the fraction of new links for each node in the network is ri, where N is the size of 
the network and 1≤ i≤ N. Then we can compute ri using the following equation 
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where i≠j, p≠q, i is not connected to j, and p is not connected to q. Assume that the cost is C, 
therefore we have d = C|E| new links added to the network. We can also use the condition   
κ < 2 to check whether the network is collapsed. From the above analysis, we can easily 
obtain from (7) that  
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where ki
0
 is the degree of i in the initial network. Figure 4 (b) shows the variation of κ based 
on equation (10). It is easy to find that κ increases when α > 0 and keeps almost unchanged 
when α < 0. The reason is that when α > 0, ri grows when ki
0
 increases. Thus κ will increase 
when adding d new links. In contrast, when α < 0, ri grows when ki
0
 decreases, the variation 
of κ will be smoothed. Then according to (8), fr will increase when α > 0 but keep almost 
unchanged when α < 0, which is similar to the result of the above numerical experiments. As 
for ft, it will increase because the heterogeneity of the network is weakened by adding new 
links when α < 0. 
5. Conclusions 
It has been proved that the scale-free network is robust to random failures but vulnerable 
to malicious attacks. However, in practical applications we hope that the network can be 
robust against not only inevitable errors during the communication but also malicious attacks, 
especially in the martial field. One possible way to enhance the robustness of an existing 
network is to add new links to it. In this paper, we propose a new parameter α, called 
enforcing parameter, to guide the process of enhancing the robustness of scale-free networks 
Figure 4. (a) is the degree distribution of the topology data from Dolphin during the 
enforcement of robustness with the ELL strategy, where d =0, 200, 400, 800 and 1000 from 
top to bottom. (b) is the variation of κ under different α, where d =0,100,600,900 and 1800 
from top to bottom. 
(a) 
(b) 
by gradually adding new links and the experiments show that the effect of enhancement is 
better when α < 0. Then, three enforcing strategies: ERR, ELL and EHH are presented. 
Through experiments and analysis, it is shown that the ELL strategy can greatly enforce the 
attack survivability of the network without negative effect on the error tolerance. In summary, 
we can efficiently enhance the robustness of scale-free networks by adding new links under 
the ELL strategy. 
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